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INTRODUCTION

n 1983 Dr. David Hilfiker le ft a comfortable medical practice in
rural Minnesota to work in a ghetto in Washington, D.C. There
he practiced "poverty medicine," not low-paid medicine-although it was
surely that, given his two-thirds eut in salary-but medicine devoted to
patients who lived in desperate poverty. He helped build a housing complex
in which he and his family lived with people who were drug addicts, mentally ill, and who otherwise lacked adequate shelter and medical services.
The needs of the community he served were overwhelming, and each day
he confronted frustrations and dangers that few physicians would tolerate.
Hilfiker is not a saint, yet he testifies that his "decision to enter the inner city
was born of a cons cio us desire to move into a doser relationship with God." 1
He also reports finding greater happiness than he had experienced before,
including moments of joy in the "miracle" of helping a homeless person return to a "community of hope."
In studying professional ethics, a familiar response to people like Dr. Hilfiker is praise followed by neglect, if not dismissal. The assumption is that personal ideals like Hilfiker's have little or nothing to do with professional ethics
perse. They are "private" matters, regardless of how admirable they may be
or how dramatically they shape careers. Professionalism (as the very term
connotes in sorne contexts) implies setting aside personal values, feelings,
and interests in order to meet the responsibilities attached to professional
roles. Failure to set as ide one's personallife constitutes a lack of professional
çlistance and creates conflicts of interest. In any case, personal values are
automatically trumped whenever they conflict with the shared duties incumbent on all members of a profession. Tho se duties alone need to be considered in studying professional ethics.
To expand this response further, professional ethics is reducible to duties
and dilemmas. It consists of (a) identifying the duties that are or should be
standardized within professional codes of ethics applicable to all members

I

of a profession, and (b) grappling with how to apply the du ti es to parti cul
situations where they conflict or have unclear implications. All prof
specify duties: to provide competent care, obtain informed consent, main
confidentiality, be honest, avoid conflicts of interest, and (collectively
other professionals) provide public access to services. How such duties
in particular roles and institutional settings is spelled out in each profession'
code of ethics. In addition, the law specifies further duties for sorne pro
sions, su ch as duties to participate in continuing education and pay __·-~'""J"j"
and registration fees. Commitments to meet these duties are important,
the duties themselves constitute the content of professional ethics. Any ad":'
ditional personal commitments are, by their very nature, excluded.
I cali this dominant perspective the consensus paradigm: Professional ethics
consists entirely of the moral requirements attached to a profession and im~
posed on all its members, together with the ethical dilemmas created when
the requirements conflict or are too vague to provide guidance. In calling
the dominant perspective, I am not claiming that all professional ethicists
avow it. It perme a tes the litera ture in professional ethics without being defended or even formulated as a viewpoint. Usually it operates as the unspoken legacy of Immanuel Kant's preoccupation with universal principles,
well as the emphasis on general rules in most human rights ethics, con tract
theory (which grounds morality in the rules that ideally rational agents would
agree upon), and rule-utilitarianianism (the view that right conduct is specified by a code of conduct that maximizes the social good).
I argue that the consensus paradigm is igi~lausible and constricting. It
neglects how personal moral commitments and ideals motiva te, sustain, and
guide professionals in their work. To be sur~. the paradigm embodies important truths. There is a vital need for shared standards to restrain greed,
secure public trust, and limit personal moral ideals wh en they become misguided. In addition, professional standards restrict inappropriate intrusions
of the personal into public life, as the scandais in Bill Clinton's term as pres-.
ident glaringly remind us. Nevertheless, the consensus paradigm is incomplete. Even questions about the proper demarcation of persona! and public
life cannat be answered until personal commitments are given their due.
Shared duties form the backbone of professional ethics, but a backbone is
not a complete anatomy.
In exploring persona! commitments, I will often introduce narrative case
studies such as that of Dr. Hilfiker and also include portrayals of professionais in works of fiction. Case studies are ubiquitous in studying professional
ethics, but almost invariably they consist of episodic (time-slice) dilemmas
about how to act when confronted with conflicting obligations. My widened
perspective encompasses these episodic dilemmas, but also attends to narratives about how personal commitments emerge, unfold, change, and are put
at risk. A diachronie perspective reveals the importance of caring relationships, meaningful work, voluntary service, burnop.t, self-betrayal, balancing
family with other commitments, and other tapies examined in this book.
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reaching. I abjure these images, and I will cnt1que the d1stortwns that generate them. Ideals are commitments to (perceived) forms of goodness around
which individu al character is formed and which are not reducible to general
duties. The ideals I explore are eminently practical. Rather than depicting
visionary vistas, they enter into what Bernard Williams calls an individual's
nexus of "ground projects" that provide meaning-giving guides and goads
throughout long and frequently arduous careers. 3 A sin cere commitment
to an ideal of justice, alleviating suffering, or promoting learning implies
both high aspiration and practical engagement within a set of given constraints. Not only are such ideals achievable in significant degrees, at least
with any luck, but the element of high aspiration often motivates greater
practical achievement than would otherwise be possible. 4
An array of commitments to varied moral goods is desirable in the professions, even though one persan could pursue only sorne of these in a lifetime. Given limited time, energy, and interest, professionals tend to focus their
endeavors on a few specifie ideals of goodness, typically th ose to which they
can contribute creatively. The resulting plurality of goods morally enriches
professions and professionals alike. Mu ch the same is true of the virtues that
correspond to the goods pursued, for example, the virtue of justice that corresponds to justice as a social good, and the virtue of compassion in alleviating suffering. The varied forms of goods and virtues are not reducible to
shared princip les of duty, even though they be ar on how professionals understand their responsibilities.
Calling ideals personal means that they shape the work of individuals
without necessarily being incumbent on all members of a profession. It does
not mean that the ideals are idiosyncratic or eccentric. Indeed, sorne of the
most important ideals are widely shared among members of religious and
moral communities, as in the case of Dr. Hilfiker. Moreover, justified persona! ideals typically instantiate general ideals of professionalism, for example, what John Kultgen says is the ideal of being "dedicated to providing
proficient service to tho se who need it,"" and wh at Albert Flores says is "a
commitment to the ideal of excellence in the exercise of professional skills

and talents as the best way of achieving the ends of a profession. "6 In
tion, justified persona! ideals usually instantiate ideals attached to
lar professions and the type of service each offers, for example nrr~,.,..,.~•-L
health (medicine and allied health fields), serving justice (law), or
efficient and safe technological goods (engineering). Far from being
neous to wider professional ideals, justified personal ideals unfold and
liven them.
However, Kultgen's and Flores's talk of "the" ideal of professionalism
of professions can be misleading. With sufficient abstraction, ail
sional commitments collapse into a few: to serve clients, promote the
lie good, and advance excellence. Such generic descriptions illuminate
shared elements in professional ethics, but they eclipse the enormous
~ty of ideals that shape individuallives and careers. Thus, describing
Ideal of medicine as the promotion of health conceals the significant
ences among health care professionals in understanding exactly what h
is, how it should be pursued, and why it is valuable. This is especially true
"health" is understood broadly as the physical and mental capacities
to function effectively in one's environment. "Effective functioning" .;;,., ..,..,: __ ~
moral and social values about desirable forms of behavior and interperson
relationships. Differences in understanding these values arise at the
of both individuals and subgroups within medicine such as Catholic
cians, Christian Scientists, and an array of holistic medicine practi
The detailed differences influence how medicine is practiced.
three things, each of
The expression "professional ethics"
I in tend in rethinking professional ethics. First, "professional ethics" mi
refer to de facto morality, that is, a professio~'s status quo on moral issues
both its professed standards and actual practices. More full y, de facto moral~
ity refers to (a) a profession 's officially endorsed moral standards as stated
its code of ethics and elaborated in related documents, as well as !"'~ """"'",.~
symbolically in awards and speeches on official occasions; (b) the
held by most members of a profession about moral issues in their profession,
~nd. (c) the patterns of morally relevant conduct manifested by most professwnals. In connection with de facto professional ethics, I draw attentitJn•
to the actual influence of personal ideals in guiding and motivating a
many professionals and professional organizations. The rest of what r
to say would be of little interest without the presence of large numbers
professionals who express moral commitments in their worlc
Second, "professional ethics" might mean justified morality in the professions, that is, the moral values desirable for professionals. The cons
paradigm restricts these values to the mandatory shared duties inc:urr1bent
on all members of a profession. In a conventional version of the paradigm,
the values are equated with the content of current codes of ethics and re..;
lated documents. In a critical version of the paradigm, the values are equated
with ideal codes of ethics, the on es that ought tq be officially endorsed and
promulgated as uniform standards within professions. Regarding the criti..,
.....

version, I urge that many personal ideals are justified because they conthe well-being of clients and the general public. For the most part, 1
interested in personal ideals that meet minimum standards of decency,
the voluntary consent of clients, and in sorne way are morally jus til seek to explore the interplay between admirable personal ideals and
those justified uniform standards emphasized in the consensus paradigm.
Third. "professional ethics" might refer to moral inquiry into the profesespecially scholarly activities and their resulting bodies of knowledge.
Moral inquiries can be divided into two categories. "Descriptive ethics" studies
de facto professional ethics. It describes and explains the actual beliefs and
conduct of professionals. As conducted by psychologists and social scientists, typically it strives to be value neutral, although sorne humanistically
mtnded scientists conduct their studies within a normative (value-laden)
framework. "Normative ethics" evaluates beliefs, conduct, and ideals. It is
an inquiry into justified professional morality. As conducted by philosophers,
religious thinkers, practitioners, and others, it is a value-laden attempt to
clarify, organize, and discover the foundations of the values desirable in the
professions. This book is a work in normative ethics. Although I touch on
theoretical issues about the foundations of professional ethics, I emphasize
applied normative ethics: the study of moral issues having practical import
in understanding responsible professionalism. My main thesis is that normative inquiries should include the roles of personal moral ideals.
Acknowledging an important role for personal ideals in the professions
is dangerous. It could easily be misunderstood by fana tics who pursue ideals
without good judgment, in disregard of the legitimate limits established by
shared professional duties and legitimate organizational authority. I attempt to avoid misunderstandings by proceeding with caution, sensitivity
to context, and ample caveats that block facile generalizations. In addition,
such an approach avoids sentimental boosterism while enabling us to appreciate professional ethics as a source of meaning in work, rather than
merely a set of onerous requirements.

